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NOTES & COMMENTS
Deflategate Pumped Up: Analyzing the
Second Circuit’s Decision and the NFL
Commissioner’s Authority
JOSH MANDEL*
Deflategate was one of the most controversial scandals
in NFL history, and while many became fascinated due to
their love of football, Deflategate was ultimately rooted in
law. NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell suspended Tom
Brady, the legendary quarterback for the New England Patriots, for four games for engaging in “conduct detrimental
to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of professional football.” More specifically, Goodell suspended
Brady because he was generally aware of Patriots staff deflating footballs prior to the 2015 AFC Championship game,
and because he failed to cooperate with the investigation
into the deflated footballs.
Commissioner Goodell controversially elected to act as
the arbitrator in Brady’s challenge to the four-game suspension, which Goodell affirmed in his arbitration award.
Thereafter, Brady successfully petitioned the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to vacate Goodell’s arbitration award. Nonetheless, the 544-day
*
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Law.
827

828

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:827

Deflategate saga ended after the Second Circuit reinstated
Goodell’s award in a 2–1 decision and denied Brady’s subsequent request for en banc review. Because two federal
judges ruled in favor of Brady, while two others ruled in favor of Goodell and the NFL, this Note acts as the tiebreaker,
wherein each issue on appeal is reevaluated and discussed
under controlling arbitration and labor law.
Upon closer examination, Deflategate presents a number of important questions about the scope and fairness of
the NFL Commissioner’s authority. Should the NFL Commissioner have the authority to elect himself as the arbitrator in a challenge to his prior disciplinary decision? Should
the NFL Commissioner have the authority to suspend, or terminate the contract of, any player who engages in “conduct
detrimental” to the NFL, despite the “conduct detrimental”
standard holding no concrete definition and being subject to
the unilateral interpretation of the NFL Commissioner?
How far can and should such a standard be stretched? Is
such a standard inherently fair simply because a court
deems it so?
While this Note begins with the discussion outlined
above—acting as the tiebreaker in the 2–2 split among federal judges—this Note then focuses more broadly on the contractual rights afforded to and enjoyed by the NFL Commissioner. In doing so, this Note explores the provisions in the
2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement that many believe grants the NFL Commissioner too much authority, and
discusses ways in which the NFL Players Association and
the NFL can come to an agreement in limiting such authority
as the negotiations for the 2021 Collective Bargaining
Agreement soon approaches.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 830
I. WHAT IS DEFLATEGATE? ............................................... 832
A. The AFC Championship Game ................................ 832
B. The Wells Report and the Suspension ...................... 833
C. Brady’s Appeal......................................................... 835
D. The Arbitration......................................................... 837

2018]

DEFLATEGATE PUMPED UP

1. FACTUAL ISSUES.................................................. 837
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES ........................................... 838
II. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE RICHARD
BERMAN’S DECISION ..................................................... 839
A. Notice ....................................................................... 840
B. Examining Jeff Pash ................................................ 842
C. The Wells Report Investigative Notes ...................... 843
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION ................................. 844
A. Majority.................................................................... 844
1. NOTICE ................................................................ 845
2. EXAMINING JEFF PASH ........................................ 849
3. THE WELLS REPORT INVESTIGATIVE NOTES ....... 850
B. Dissent...................................................................... 850
IV. BREAKING THE 2–2 TIE .................................................. 851
A. Governing Labor and Arbitration Law .................... 852
B. Article 46’s Provisions ............................................. 853
C. The Standard NFL Player Contract......................... 854
D. Notice ....................................................................... 854
1. SUSPENSION OR FINE ........................................... 854
2. ANALOGIZING DEFLATING FOOTBALLS TO STEROID
USE ...................................................................... 855
3. PUNISHMENT FOR SPECIFIC CONDUCT ................. 857
4. DISCIPLINE FOR PROVIDING INDUCEMENTS AND
REWARDS ........................................................... 859
E. Examining Jeff Pash ................................................ 861
F. The Wells Report Investigative Notes ...................... 863
G. Brady’s Request for En Banc Review ...................... 864
H. Commentary to the Second Circuit’s Majority
Opinion .................................................................... 865
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NFL COMMISSIONER’S
AUTHORITY .................................................................... 866
A. The Power of Article 46 ........................................... 866
B. Looking to the 2021 CBA ......................................... 871
CONCLUSION......................................................................... 879

829

830

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:827

INTRODUCTION
New England Patriots (“Patriots”) quarterback Tom Brady is a
living football legend, considered by many to be the greatest quarterback of all time. His achievements on the gridiron are endless: at
the close of the 2017 National Football League (“NFL”) regular season, Brady had thrown for 66,159 yards, 488 touchdowns, and just
160 career interceptions.1 Yet, despite his unquestioned greatness,
one interception would forever associate Brady with the most controversial NFL scandal to date.
The interception in question occurred on January 18, 2015, when
the Patriots defeated the Indianapolis Colts (“Colts”) in the American Football Conference (“AFC”) Championship game.2 During the
second quarter, Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson intercepted
Brady’s pass.3 During halftime, the game referees tested the air pressure on twelve of the Patriots’ footballs after becoming aware that
the footballs might have been underinflated.4 The referees found that
eleven of the twelve balls were, in fact, underinflated,5 prompting
the 544-day scandal known as “Deflategate.”6
A subsequent investigative report (“the Wells Report”) into the
deflated footballs was published.7 The Wells Report concluded that
New England Patriots, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/
player/tombrady/2504211/careerstats (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
2
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Tom Brady Carries Pats to Rout of Colts, Claims Sixth
Super Bowl Trip, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/game?gameId=
400749520.
3
John Breech, Colts LB D’Qwell Jackson Basically Started Deflategate on
Accident, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-onfootball/24984712/did-colts-lb-dqwell-jackson-start-deflategate-on-accident.
4
Mark Sandritter, NFL Determines Patriots Used Deflated Footballs During AFC Championship, Per Report, SBNATION (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:09 PM),
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/1/20/7864117/patriots-deflated-footballs-nflnew-england-bill-belichick.
5
Id.
6
Alex Reimer, Deflategate Officially Ended 544 Days After It Started, but
We Can’t Stop Talking About it, SBNATION, http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/
8/31/9213261/deflategate-timeline-tom-brady-roger-gooddell-patriots/in/762215
4 (last updated Feb. 5, 2017, 12:45 PM) [hereinafter Deflategate Officially
Ended].
7
See generally THEODORE V. WELLS, JR. ET AL., PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING FOOTBALLS
1
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it was “more probable than not” that Brady was “generally aware”
of misconduct committed by Patriots employees in relation to the
deflation of the footballs.8 As a result, NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell suspended Brady for the first four games of the following
2015–2016 NFL regular season because Brady had engaged in “conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in” the
NFL.9 Goodell later announced that he would elect to serve as the
arbitrator in Brady’s appeal.10
Goodell upheld the suspension in his arbitration award.11 Thereafter, Brady petitioned the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to vacate Goodell’s arbitration
award, which was ultimately granted by Judge Richard Berman.12
The NFL appealed Judge Berman’s decision to the Second Circuit,
where Goodell’s arbitration award was reinstated.13 On July 13,
2016, Brady’s petition for a Second Circuit en banc rehearing was
denied.14
Because two federal judges ruled in favor of Brady and two others ruled in favor of the NFL, this Note analyzes the conflicting
views between the courts, and discusses which views were more in
line with legal standards and case law. In other words, this Note analyzes, and thus predicts, which way the Second Circuit en banc

USED DURING THE AFC CHAMPIONSHIP GAME ON JANUARY 18, 2015 (2015),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Deflategate.pdf.
8
Id. at 2.
9
NFL releases statement on Patriots’ violations, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE:
NEWS, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000492190/article/nfl-releasesstatement-on-patriots-violations (updated May 11, 2015, 8:48 PM).
10
Jonathan Clegg, Goodell Appoints Himself Arbitrator of Brady Appeal,
WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 15, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/goodell-appoints-himself-arbitrator-of-brady-appeal-1431703420.
11
Roger Goodell, National Football League, Final Decision on Article 46
Appeal of Tom Brady 20 (July 28, 2015), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/
2015/07/07282015-final-decision-tom-brady-appeal.pdf.
12
Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players
Ass’n (NFL Mgmt. Council I), 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
13
Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players
Ass’n (NFL Mgmt. Council II), 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016).
14
Alex Reimer, Tom Brady’s DeflateGate Appeal is Rejected, Suspension
Stands, SBNATION (July 13, 2016, 9:45 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2016/
7/13/11779840/tom-brady-deflategate-appeal-rejected.
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panel would have decided if it had granted Brady’s request for a
rehearing.
Deflategate was just one example of the NFL Commissioner’s
broad disciplinary and governing authority. Following the detailed
discussion of Deflategate, this Note addresses the provisions of the
NFL and NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that
grant the NFL Commissioner authority, which many consider far
too broad and unfair to players. This Note offers an eye-opening example, wherein the NFL Commissioner, under the relevant authority
in the CBA, could suspend, or terminate the contract of, a player for
engaging in constitutionally-protected behavior. Finally, in an attempt to limit the Commissioner’s authority, this Note offers suggestions and recommendations to the NFLPA and NFL (including
Roger Goodell himself) in advance of the inevitable collective bargaining to follow the expiration of the current CBA in 2021.
This Note begins in Part I with a detailed background of the facts
in Deflategate. Part II explains Judge Berman’s reasons for vacating
Goodell’s arbitration award. Part III explains the reasoning of the
Second Circuit majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes
all three judicial opinions under controlling legal principles, thereby
predicting what the Second Circuit en banc panel, if it had granted
rehearing, would have considered and held. Finally, Part V examines the NFL and NFLPA CBA and addresses relevant concerns
about the NFL Commissioner’s power.
I.

WHAT IS DEFLATEGATE?

A.
The AFC Championship Game
On January 18, 2015, the Patriots played against the Colts in the
AFC Championship game.15 During the second quarter of the game,
Patriots quarterback Tom Brady threw a pass that was intercepted
by Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson.16 Jackson returned to the
Colts sideline with the ball in hand and ultimately an equipment staff
member informed Colts head coach Chuck Pagano that the ball felt
underinflated.17 After Coach Pagano notified the appropriate NFL
personnel, the game referees tested the pounds per square inch
15
16
17

ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
Breech, supra note 3.
Id.
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(“psi”) levels of the Patriots’ and Colts’ footballs.18 The referees
found that all four of the Colts’ footballs were within the NFL’s permissible psi range of 12.5 to 13.5,19 while eleven out of twelve of
the Patriots’ footballs were deflated to a psi below 12.5. 20 The Patriots won the game handily, with a score of 45–7,21 and eventually
went on to win the Super Bowl by beating the Seattle Seahawks in
historic fashion.22
On January 23, 2015, Goodell released the NFL’s first statement
concerning what quickly became dubbed “Deflategate” by sports
media.23 In the statement, Goodell notified the public that the NFL
was “conducting an investigation as to whether the footballs used
in . . . [the] AFC Championship Game complied with the specifications that are set forth in . . . Playing Rule 2, Section 1, which requires that the ball be inflated to between 12.5 and 13.5 [psi].”24
Goodell then explained that NFL Executive Vice President Jeff Pash
and Ted Wells of the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison (“Paul, Weiss”) would lead the investigation.25
B.
The Wells Report and the Suspension
The 243-page Wells Report was published on May 6, 2015.26 In
the report, Ted Wells found that it was more probable than not that
Patriots equipment assistant John Jastremski and Patriots locker
room attendant Jim McNally deliberately deflated footballs, and that

18
See Sandritter, supra note 4. Interestingly, NFL policy allows for each team
to provide their own footballs for a game––and Tom Brady led the charge to implement this policy. See Dana Hunsinger Benbow, How Tom Brady Helped
Change Rule for Pre-Game Care of Footballs, USA TODAY SPORTS (Jan. 26,
2015, 6:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2015/01/26/tombrady-deflategate-peyton-manning-rule-change-nfl/22372835/.
19
WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. See generally Rulebook: Rule 2: The
Ball, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/
rulebook/pdfs/5_2013_Ball.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
20
Sandritter, supra note 4.
21
ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
22
See Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6.
23
NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE: COMMUNICATIONS, NFL STATEMENT (2015),
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/1-23-15-nfl-statement-2.pdf.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
See generally WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7.
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“it [was] more probable than not that [Brady] was at least generally
aware of the inappropriate activities of McNally and Jastremski.”27
The investigative team relied on the following in reaching its
conclusion: (1) text messages between McNally and Jastremski;28
(2) the unusual relationship between Brady and Jastremski following the AFC Championship Game;29 (3) the low likelihood that an
equipment assistant and a locker room attendant would deflate footballs without the star quarterback’s approval;30 and (4) Brady’s public acknowledgement that he prefers game balls at a lower psi level,
as well as his involvement in the 2006 rule change regarding how
teams prepare footballs during road games.31 It was also noted in the
Wells Report that, upon request, Brady declined to provide texts,
emails, or any documents and electronic information relevant to the
investigation.32
On May 11, 2015, the NFL punished Brady for his role in Deflategate.33 NFL Executive President Troy Vincent wrote a letter to
Brady, stating that “pursuant to the authority of the Commissioner
under Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and
[Brady’s] NFL Player Contract,” Brady was to be suspended without pay for the first four games of the 2015–2016 regular season.34
In his letter to Brady, Vincent explained that
the [Wells] report established that there is substantial
and credible evidence to conclude you were at least
generally aware of the actions of the Patriots’ employees involved in the deflation of the footballs and
that it was unlikely that their actions were done without your knowledge. Moreover, the report documents
your failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the
27

Id. at 2.
See id. at 4–7.
29
See id. at 18.
30
See id. at 19.
31
See id.
32
It is important to note that Brady’s refusal to provide the requested information was not material to the conclusions made in the Wells Report. See id. at
21.
33
Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6.
34
Troy Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, ESPN (May 12, 2015),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady.
28
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investigation, including by refusing to produce any
relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.) . . . .
Your actions . . . clearly constitute conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the
game of professional football.35
C.
Brady’s Appeal
Brady formally appealed his suspension on May 14, 2015.36
Later that day, Goodell announced that he would serve as the arbitrator in Brady’s appeal.37 Such a decision was unexpected given
Goodell’s usual practice of appointing independent arbitrators for
high-profile appeals,38 and the fact that Goodell decided to hold an
independent investigation (i.e., the Wells Report).
Brady, represented by the NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”)
and New York attorney Jeffrey Kessler,39 filed a number of motions
requesting that (1) Goodell recuse himself as arbitrator, (2) the NFL
produce Commissioner Goodell, NFL Executive Vice President
Troy Vincent, NFL Executive Vice President Jeff Pash, and Ted
Wells as witnesses at Brady’s arbitration, and (3) the NFL produce
“[a]ll documents created, obtained, or reviewed by NFL investigators (including Mr. Wells and his investigative team at the Paul,
Weiss firm and NFL security personnel) in connection with the Patriots Investigation (including all notes, summaries, or memoranda
describing or memorializing any witness interviews).”40
Goodell released a letter to the public on June 2, 2015, where he
explained his reasons for denying Brady’s request for Goodell’s
recusal as arbitrator.41 In short, the letter explained that the CBA

35

Id. (emphasis added).
Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6.
37
Clegg, supra note 10.
38
See id.
39
See Jeffrey L. Kessler, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, http://www.winston.com/en/who-we-are/attorneys/kessler-jeffrey-l.html (last visited Feb 25,
2018).
40
Motions for Tom Brady at 2, Re: Tom Brady Article 46 Appeal, http://thesportsesquires.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/NFLPA-Brady-Motion-toCompel-Witnesses-and-Discovery.pdf.
41
Letter from Roger Goodell to NFLPA Regarding Brady Appeal, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE: NEWS, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000495253/
36
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“provides that ‘at his discretion,’ the Commissioner may serve as
hearing officer in ‘any appeal’ involving conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”42
In this letter, Goodell responded to three arguments Brady made
for Goodell’s recusal. First, in response to Brady’s argument that
Goodell should recuse himself because of NFL Executive Vice President Troy Vincent’s role in deciding Brady’s discipline (i.e., that
Vincent, rather than Goodell, disciplined Brady), Goodell stated that
he never ordered Vincent to discipline Brady.43 Instead, Goodell explained that Vincent was authorized to inform Brady of the suspension and the reasons supporting the discipline in a written letter.44
Second, in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell should recuse
himself because he was a “necessary” or “central” witness in the
appeal proceeding, Goodell simply denied this allegation.45 Third,
in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell should recuse himself
because he had prejudged the matter, Goodell stated that, despite his
public appreciation for the work done by Ted Wells and the Paul,
Weiss firm, he was not “wedded to their conclusion or to their assessment of the facts.”46 Goodell then expressed that he had an open
mind going into the arbitration.47
Almost three weeks later, on June 22, 2015, Goodell denied
Brady’s additional requests: that NFL Executive Vice President Jeff
Pash testify, and that the investigative notes used in drafting the
Wells Report be provided to Brady.48 In support of his denials,
Goodell explained that Pash did not play a substantial role in the
investigation, and that the investigative notes played no role in
Goodell’s decision to suspend Brady.49

article/letter-from-roger-goodell-to-nflpa-regarding-brady-appeal (updated June
2, 2015, 3:04 PM).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See id.
45
See id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
49
Id.
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D.
The Arbitration
The arbitration appeal hearing was held on June 23, 2015.50 Five
days later, Goodell published his arbitration award confirming
Brady’s suspension.51 The award addressed a number of issues, but
only the following four are relevant for this Note. The first two issues are factual, while the second two are procedural.
1.
FACTUAL ISSUES
Goodell first addressed Brady’s role in the deflation of the footballs.52 Goodell’s ultimate conclusion was that “Brady knew about,
approved of, consented to, and provided inducements and rewards
in support of a scheme by which, with Mr. Jastremski’s support, Mr.
McNally tampered with the game balls.”53 Goodell relied on the following: (1) Brady’s relationship with Jastremski and McNally; (2)
the frequency, duration, and location of Brady’s conversations with
Jastremski and McNally; (3) the Wells Report investigators’ interviews; (4) and text messages between Jastremski and McNally in
reference to Brady and footballs.54
Next, Goodell looked to Brady’s level of cooperation with the
Wells Report investigation, initially noting that
[t]he most significant new information that emerged
in connection with the appeal was evidence that on
or about March 6, 2015—the very day he was interviewed by Mr. Wells and his investigative team—
Mr. Brady instructed his assistant to destroy the cellphone that he had been using since early November
2014, a period that included the AFC Championship
Game and the initial weeks of the subsequent investigation . . . At the time that he arranged for its destruction, Mr. Brady knew that Mr. Wells and his

50
51
52
53
54

Goodell, supra note 11, at 1.
Id.
See id. at 7–11.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Id. at 7–11.
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team had requested information from that cellphone
in connection with their investigation.55
As to these factual issues, Goodell ultimately found that
(1) Mr. Brady participated in a scheme to tamper
with the game balls after they had been approved by
the game officials for use in the AFC Championship
Game and (2) Mr. Brady willfully obstructed the investigation by, among other things, affirmatively arranging for destruction of his cellphone knowing that
it contained potentially relevant information that had
been requested by the investigators. All of this indisputably constitutes conduct detrimental to the integrity of, and public confidence in, the game of professional football.56
2.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Goodell then moved on to two procedural issues. First, Goodell
addressed his decision to suspend Brady for four games, rather than
to fine him.57 Goodell pointed out that “[n]o prior conduct detrimental proceeding is directly comparable to this one.”58 As a result,
Goodell stated the following:
In terms of the appropriate level of discipline, the
closest parallel of which I am aware is the collectively bargained discipline imposed for a first violation of the policy governing performance enhancing
drugs; steroid use reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game. . . . [T]he first positive test for
the use of [PEDs] has resulted in a four-game suspension without the need for any finding of actual
competitive effect.59

55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
See id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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Next, in response to Brady’s argument that he was not given notice of possible discipline for his actions, Goodell noted that Brady
was aware of or had notice with respect to the following: (1) that the
authorized psi range for game balls was between 12.5 and 13.5; (2)
that it is reasonable to believe that tampering with game balls could
affect the integrity of, and public confidence in, the game of professional football; and (3) that destroying cell phones, which were essential to investigators, would itself be deemed conduct detrimental.60 Goodell also pointed out that “the CBA-mandated standard NFL Player Contract, which Mr. Brady signed, makes clear and
provides notice that, in the event of a finding of conduct detrimental,
[Goodell] may ‘suspend Player for a period certain or indefinitely.’”61
II.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE RICHARD
BERMAN’S DECISION

Brady filed a petition to vacate Goodell’s arbitration award in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.62 On September 3, 2015, presiding Judge Richard Berman
ruled in favor of Brady, thereby vacating the four-game suspension.63 Judge Berman outlined the issues presented:
(A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential
discipline (four-game suspension) and his alleged
misconduct; (B) denial of the opportunity for Brady
to examine one of two lead investigators, namely
NFL Executive Vice President . . . Jeff Pash; and (C)
denial of equal access to investigative files, including
witness interview notes.64

60

See id. at 18.
Id. For a detailed discussion about this relevant provision of the CBAmandated standard NFL Player Contract, see infra Part V.
62
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
63
Id. at 449, 453.
64
Id. at 463.
61
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A.
Notice
In response to Brady’s allegation of improper notice,65 Judge
Berman analyzed four questions presented: (1) whether Brady was
on notice that he could be suspended based on a comparison between
deflating footballs and steroid use; (2) whether Brady was on notice
he could be suspended for being generally aware of others’ misconduct; (3) whether Brady was on notice his specific conduct could
lead to a suspension; and (4) whether the CBA’s Article 46 conduct
detrimental standard provided sufficient notice.66
As to the first question presented,67 Judge Berman found that no
NFL player who “had a general awareness of the inappropriate ball
deflation activities of others or who schemed with others to let air
out of footballs . . . and also had not cooperated in an ensuing investigation, reasonably could be on notice that their discipline would”
be equal to that of a steroid user.68 In support of this finding, Judge
Berman relied on oral arguments,69 the bargained-for Steroid Policy
in the CBA,70 Ted Wells’ testimony,71 and former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue’s observation in the Bountygate72 matter.73
Judge Berman then argued that Goodell violated the law of the
shop74 because Goodell did not draw his award from the CBA, and
instead “‘must have based his award on some body of thought, or
feeling, or policy, or law that is outside [of the CBA].’”75

65

See id. at 463–70.
See id.
67
See id. at 465.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 463.
70
Id. at 464.
71
Id. at 464–65.
72
See generally Katherine Terrell, New Orleans Saints Bounty Scandal Timeline, NOLA, http://www.nola.com/saints/index.ssf/2012/12/bounty_scandal_
timeline.html (updated Dec. 12, 2012, 9:11 AM).
73
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463, 465–66.
74
For more information on the arbitration principle of the “law of the shop,”
see Jerome S. Rubenstein, Some Thoughts on Labor Arbitration, 49 MARQUETTE
L. REV. 695, 698 (1966) (explaining that “[w]hen an arbitrator enforces a past
practice [prevalent in the industry,] he is merely declaring the industrial ‘common
law of the shop.’”). See also infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text.
75
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
66

2018]

DEFLATEGATE PUMPED UP

841

As to the second question presented,76 Judge Berman emphasized that the “principal finding” in the Wells Report and Troy Vincent’s suspension letter to Brady was that Brady was generally
aware of others’ misconduct.77 Judge Berman then explained that
“no NFL policy or precedent notifies players that they may be disciplined (much less suspended) for general awareness of misconduct
by others.”78 Further, Judge Berman found that the NFL has never
punished players before for Brady’s specific conduct.79 As a result,
Judge Berman concluded that Goodell’s arbitration award violated
the law of the shop because “Brady had no notice that such conduct
was prohibited, or any reasonable certainty of potential discipline
stemming from such conduct.”80
As to the third question presented,81 Judge Berman found that
Brady was not on notice that his conduct could lead to a suspension
under the Competitive Integrity Policy.82 Judge Berman reasoned
that Brady “had no legal notice of discipline under the Competitive
Integrity Policy, which is . . . distributed solely to—and, therefore,
provides notice to—‘Chief Executives, Club Presidents, General
Managers, and Head Coaches,’ and not to players.”83
As to the fourth and final question presented,84 Judge Berman
concluded that Goodell’s use of the conduct detrimental standard in
Article 46, rather than specific Player Policies, was “legally misplaced” as a basis for deciding Brady’s discipline.85 Further, he

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.; see id. at 467 n.18.
Id. at 467–68.
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 469.
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 468–70.
Id. at 470.
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pointed out an inconsistency, in that the past conduct of Adrian Peterson86 and of Ray Rice87 could have been considered conduct detrimental, where in fact “[they] were disciplined . . . under the specific domestic violence policy . . . because an applicable specific
provision within the Player Policies is better calculated to provide
notice to a player than [the] general . . . ‘conduct detrimental.’”88
B.
Examining Jeff Pash
Judge Berman found that the arbitration was fundamentally unfair because of Goodell’s decision to not require testimony from Jeff
Pash, the NFL Executive Vice President who acted as the co-lead
Wells Report investigator.89 Judge Berman acknowledged the broad
discretion that arbitrators have with respect to admitting evidence
into the arbitration.90 Nonetheless, Judge Berman held that Brady
was “foreclosed from exploring . . . whether the . . . Investigation
was truly ‘independent,’ and how and why [Pash] came to edit a
supposedly independent investigation report.”91
Judge Berman then looked generally to NFL arbitration precedent, finding that “in Article 46 arbitration appeals, players must be
afforded the opportunity to confront their investigators.”92 After
comparing this matter to the Bountygate93 and Ray Rice94 matters
(i.e., where all individuals associated with the investigation were
compelled to testify), Judge Berman stated: “[g]iven Mr. Pash’s
86
See generally Conor Orr, Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000430302/article/
adrian-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-rest-of-14 (updated Nov. 18, 2014,
5:38 PM).
87
See generally Ryan Wilson, Ray Rice Cut by Ravens, Indefinitely Banned
by NFL Amid Video Fallout, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ray-rice-cut-by-ravens-indefinitely-bannedby-nfl-amid-video-fallout/.
88
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 470.
89
Id. at 472.
90
Id. at 471 (citing Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12 Civ.
283(GBD), 2013 WL 789642, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013)).
91
Id. at 472. Interestingly, in his opinion, Judge Berman questioned the independence of the Wells Report investigation by bolding or quoting the word “independent” seven times. See generally id.
92
Id. at 471.
93
See generally Terrell, supra note 72.
94
See generally Wilson, supra note 87.
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very senior position in the NFL . . . and his designation as co-lead
investigator with Ted Wells, it is logical that he would have valuable
insight into the course and outcome of the Investigation and into the
drafting and content of the Wells Report.”95 Accordingly, Judge
Berman held that “[t]he issues known to Pash constituted ‘evidence
plainly pertinent and material to the controversy,’ and [Goodell’s]
refusal to hear such evidence warrants vacatur.”96
C.
The Wells Report Investigative Notes
Judge Berman found prejudice against Brady when Goodell denied him access to the Wells Report investigative notes.97 Judge
Berman stated that “Brady was denied the opportunity to examine
and challenge materials that may have led to his suspension and
which likely facilitated Paul, Weiss attorneys’ cross-examination of
him.”98
Judge Berman focused primarily on one troubling fact: “Paul,
Weiss acted as both alleged ‘independent’ counsel during the Investigation and also (perhaps inconsistently) as retained counsel to the
NFL during the arbitration.”99 On this issue, Judge Berman further
stated that
Paul, Weiss uniquely was able to retain access to investigative files and interview notes which it had developed; was able to use them in direct and crossexamination of Brady and other arbitration witnesses; share them with NFL officials during the arbitral proceedings; and, at the same time, withhold
them from Brady.100
This duality of roles led Judge Berman to believe that Goodell
and Pash may have had “greater access to valuable impressions, insights, and other investigative information which was not available

95
96
97
98
99
100

NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to Brady.”101 As a result, Judge Berman concluded that Goodell’s
decision was fundamentally unfair.102
Judge Berman closed his opinion by vacating Goodell’s award,
thereby overturning Brady’s four-game suspension.103 And, of
course, one week after Judge Berman’s opinion was published,
Brady threw four touchdowns in a 28–21 win over the Pittsburgh
Steelers.104
III.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION

The NFL appealed Judge Berman’s vacatur to the Second Circuit.105 In a controversial 2-1 decision published on April 25, 2016,
the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the NFL, thereby reinstating
Goodell’s arbitration award.106
A.
Majority
Judge Barrington Parker, joined by Judge Denny Chin, opened
his majority opinion by explaining the general principle driving his
findings:
[A] federal court’s review of labor arbitration awards
is narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential—
indeed, among the most deferential in the law. Our
role is not to determine for ourselves . . . whether the
suspension imposed by the Commissioner should
have been for three games or five games or none at
all. Nor is it our role to second-guess the arbitrator’s
procedural rulings. Our obligation is limited to determining whether the arbitration proceedings and
award met the minimum legal standards established
by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)
[to] ensure that the arbitrator was “even arguably
101

Id. at 472.
Id.
103
Id. at 474.
104
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Tom Brady’s 4 Passing TDs, 3 to Rob Gronkowski,
Highlight Pats’ Opening Win, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/
recap?gameId=400791485.
105
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016).
106
Id. at 527, 532.
102
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construing or applying the contract and acting within
the scope of his authority” and did not “ignore the
plain language of the contract.” These standards do
not require perfection in arbitration awards. Rather,
they dictate that even if an arbitrator makes mistakes
of fact or law, we may not disturb an award so long
as he acted within the bounds of his bargained-for
authority.107
Under this principle, Judge Parker responded to the district
court’s “three bases for overturning Brady’s suspension: (1) lack of
adequate notice that deflation of footballs could lead to a four-game
suspension, (2) the exclusion of testimony from Pash,” and (3) the
refusal to provide Brady access to the Paul, Weiss investigative
notes.108
1.
NOTICE
With respect to notice, Judge Parker addressed five issues. Regarding the first of the five issues, Judge Berman found that Brady
was only provided notice that his specific conduct could be disciplined under the Player Policies, “which are collected in a handbook
distributed to all NFL players at the beginning of each season, [and]
include a section entitled ‘Other Uniform/Equipment Violations.’”109 Further, Judge Berman reasoned that the Player Policies
only provided that under the section entitled Other Uniform/Equipment Violations, “[f]irst offenses will result in fines.”110
Judge Parker found two flaws inherent in Judge Berman’s findings. The initial flaw was pointed out during arbitration, where the
NFLPA, on behalf of Brady, discredited its own argument by stating
“we don’t believe [the Player Policy] applie[d] either, because there
is nothing [in the Player Policy] about the balls.”111 Judge Parker
agreed, finding that the Player Policies, and more specifically, the
section entitled Other Uniform/Equipment Violations, “says nothing
about tampering with, or the preparation of, footballs, and, indeed,
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 532.
Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 538.
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does not mention the words ‘tampering,’ ‘ball,’ or ‘deflation’ at
all.”112 Conversely, Judge Parker noted that Article 46 authorized
Goodell to discipline players for conduct believed to threaten the
integrity of the game, and as such, there was “little difficulty in concluding that the Commissioner’s decision to discipline Brady pursuant to Article 46 was ‘plausibly grounded in the parties’ agreement,’
which is all the law requires.”113
The next flaw Judge Parker noted within the first of five issues
was that the 2014 Schedule of Fines makes clear that the fines referred to and relied upon by Judge Berman are only minimums.114
The 2014 Schedule of Fines states that “other forms of discipline,
including higher fines and suspension may also be imposed, based
on the circumstances of the particular violation.”115 Judge Parker
concluded that Goodell’s interpretation of the Player Policies and
2014 Schedule of Fines was “at least ‘barely colorable,’ which,
again, is all that the law requires.”116
The second of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed
was in relation to Goodell’s steroid comparison.117 Judge Parker
stated that Goodell “was within his discretion in drawing a helpful,
if somewhat imperfect, comparison” between deflating footballs and
steroid use when considering the discipline imposed on Brady.118
Judge Parker further explained:
[i]f deference means anything, it means that the arbitrator is entitled to generous latitude in phrasing his
conclusions. . . . While [Brady] may have been entitled to notice of his range of punishment, it does not
follow that he was entitled to advance notice of the
analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive in selecting a punishment within that range.119

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 540.
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In response to the dissent’s claim120 that vacatur is warranted
because Goodell “failed to [analogize] a policy regarding
stickum,”121 Judge Parker stated that “even if the fine for stickum is
the most appropriate analogy to Brady’s conduct, nothing in the
CBA or our case law demands that the arbitrator discuss comparable
conduct merely because we find that analogy more persuasive than
others.”122 Judge Parker insisted that although “the penalty meted
out to Brady [may be] harsh,” vacatur was not warranted. 123 As an
important aside, Judge Parker noted that the CBA did not even require Goodell to provide an explanation for his discipline; rather,
Goodell was free to suspend Brady without any analogy at all.124
The third of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed
was whether Brady was on notice that he could be suspended for
being “generally aware” of others’ misconduct.125 Judge Parker split
this issue twofold.126 First, in response to Judge Berman’s finding
that there is no disciplinary precedent comparable to Brady’s (i.e.,
discipline for the conduct of deflating footballs), Judge Parker alleged that Judge Berman “misapprehend[ed] the record”––
Goodell’s award clearly stated that Brady’s discipline was confirmed because he “‘participated in a scheme to tamper with game
balls’ and ‘willfully obstructed the investigation by . . . arranging
for destruction of his cellphone.’”127 In other words, Brady was disciplined for reasons that Judge Berman omitted.
Second, in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell was
bound to the conclusions in the Wells Report, Judge Parker pointed
to Article 46, which notably does not limit an arbitrator from reassessing the factual basis for the discipline at issue.128 Judge Parker
120

See infra Section III.B.
For more information on what stickum is, see John Gennaro, San Diego
Chargers: What Is “Stickum”, Anyway?, SBNATION (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:12 PM),
https://www.boltsfromtheblue.com/2012/10/22/3539890/what-is-stickum-sandiego-chargers (stickum is “a powder, paste, or aerosol spray” applied to players’
hands or gloves to improve their grip when catching or handling a football).
122
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 540, 552.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 540–41.
125
See id. at 541–42.
126
See id.
127
Id. at 541 (quoting Goodell, supra note 11) (emphasis added).
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See id.
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made his point by noting that “[b]ecause the point of a hearing in
any proceeding is to establish a complete factual record, it would be
incoherent to both authorize a hearing and at the same time insist
that no new findings or conclusions could be [made].”129 And, to
Brady’s argument that the language used in Goodell’s award improperly implied his conduct was more severe than the findings in
the Wells Report, Judge Parker found that “nothing in the CBA suggests that [Goodell] was barred from concluding, based on new information generated during the hearing, that Brady’s conduct was
more serious than was initially believed.”130
The fourth of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed
was whether Brady was on notice that he could be disciplined for
non-cooperation in the Wells Report investigation.131 Judge Berman
found that Goodell’s award could not be upheld because no player
in NFL history had ever been disciplined for “alleged failure to cooperate with—or even allegedly obstructing—an NFL investigation.”132 Brady also argued that he “had no notice that the destruction of the cell phone would even be at issue in the arbitration proceeding.”133 In response to both Brady and Judge Berman, Judge
Parker explained that the NFL’s letter to Brady, which stated that he
was suspended for reasons such as “failure to cooperate fully and
candidly with the investigation, including by refusing to produce
any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.),” gave “clear
notice [to Brady] that his cooperation with the investigation was a
subject of significant interest.”134 Further, Judge Parker pointed out
that the testimony of one of Brady’s expert witnesses regarding why
Brady destroyed his cellphone suggested that Brady “had at least
enough notice of the potential consequences of the cell phone destruction to retain an expert in advance of the arbitration.”135 Judge
Parker also articulated that “any reasonable litigant would understand that the destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the

129
130
131
132
133
134
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Id.
Id.
See id. at 542–44.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
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start of arbitration proceedings, would be an important issue,” and
concluded that there was no fundamental unfairness as a result.136
The last of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed was
whether Brady was on notice that he could be suspended, rather than
fined.137 In response to Judge Berman’s position that the Player Policies only provided Brady with notice that he could be fined and not
suspended, Judge Parker found that Brady’s suspension was based
on Article 46’s conduct detrimental standard, not the Player Policies.138 In other words, “Article 46 put [Brady] on notice prior to the
AFC Championship Game that any action deemed by [Goodell] to
be ‘conduct detrimental’ could lead to suspension.”139
2.
EXAMINING JEFF PASH
Regarding Goodell’s denial to compel Jeff Pash’s testimony,
Judge Parker concluded that Goodell’s decision fit “comfortably
within [Goodell’s] broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence
and raises no questions of fundamental fairness.”140 After acknowledging the vast deference that arbitrators are afforded, Judge Parker
pointed out that Pash’s testimony would cover whether the Wells
Report investigation was truly “independent,” which was separate
from the main issue: whether Brady engaged in conduct detrimental
to the NFL.141 Judge Parker found that “[t]he CBA does not require
an independent investigation, and nothing would have prohibited
[Goodell] from using an in-house team to conduct the investigation.
The [NFLPA] and [NFL] bargained for and agreed in the CBA on a
structure that” made the NFL and Goodell responsible for both investigation and adjudication.142

136

Id. at 544.
Id. at 544–45.
138
See id. at 544.
139
Id. at 544–45. As explained infra in Section V.A., the Standard NFL Player
Contract, which every player (including Brady) signs, also provides notice to
players that the Commissioner is permitted to fine, suspend, and even terminate
the contract of a player should the Commissioner reasonably judge that the
player’s conduct was detrimental to the League. See infra Section V.A.
140
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 546.
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3.
THE WELLS REPORT INVESTIGATIVE NOTES
Judge Parker decided that Goodell’s refusal to allow Brady access to the Wells Report investigative notes was fundamentally
fair.143 Judge Parker clarified that Article 46 only required sharing
of exhibits that the adverse parties intend to rely on.144 Given
Goodell’s claim that he never used the investigative notes to determine Brady’s discipline, Judge Parker concluded that “[Goodell]
was, at the very least, ‘arguably construing or applying the
[CBA].’”145
B.
Dissent
Second Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann was the lone dissenter.146 Judge Katzmann only addressed two points: (1) that
Goodell based his final decision on misconduct different from that
originally charged; and (2) that Goodell instituted his own brand of
industrial justice because of the failure to use stickum as the proper
analogy for punishment.147
With respect to his first point, Judge Katzmann stated that
Goodell improperly based his arbitration award on misconduct that
was different from the misconduct that influenced the initial fourgame suspension.148 Judge Katzmann focused on one of the reasons
Goodell provided in his arbitration award—that “[Brady] provided
inducements and rewards [to John Jastremski and Jim McNally for
their efforts in deflating footballs].”149 But, Judge Katzmann noted
that nowhere in the Wells Report was there a finding that “it was
‘more probable than not’ that the gifts Brady provided [to Jastremski
and McNally] were intended as rewards or advance payment for deflating footballs in violation of [NFL] rules.”150 In other words,
Judge Katzmann alleged that the Wells Report failed to put Brady
on notice “that he was found to have engaged in a quid pro quo”;

143
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See id. at 546–57.
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yet quid pro quo was one reason Goodell confirmed his initial discipline.151
Judge Katzmann interestingly noted that Brady’s brief was quiet
on this issue––this silence, according to Judge Katzmann, reflected
the lack of notice.152 Judge Katzmann reasoned that if Brady had
been aware that Goodell was going to focus on this alleged quid pro
quo, then Brady may have been able to persuade Goodell to reverse
his initial discipline.153
Regarding his second point, Judge Katzmann reasoned that
Goodell’s analogy comparing deflating footballs to using steroids,
rather than to using stickum,154 reflected that the arbitration award
was not based on Goodell’s interpretation of the CBA.155 A fine for
using stickum would amount to $8,268—an amount much less than
Brady’s loss of compensation for the four games he was suspended
for.156 Judge Katzmann concluded that, with respect to Goodell’s
analogy to steroid use, “[t]he lack of any meaningful explanation in
[his] final written decision convinces me that [he] was doling out his
own brand of industrial justice.”157
IV.

BREAKING THE 2–2 TIE

In response to the Second Circuit’s 2–1 reversal of the district
court’s ruling, University of New Hampshire Law Professor Michael McCann stated “you might say there were [four] federal
judges that studied this case and [two] of them ruled for Brady, [two]
of them ruled for the NFL.”158 Given such conflict, this Part describes controlling principles, and then applies them to the facts and
151
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Id. at 551.
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Id.
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For more information on stickum, see John Gennaro, supra note 121. Judge
Katzmann reasoned that stickum, “a substance that enhances a player’s grip,” was
more similar to deflating footballs than using steroids because using stickum and
deflating footballs both improve grip and are used without the permission of the
referee. See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 552 (Katzman, J., dissenting).
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issues in Deflategate to determine which of the conflicting views
likely would have prevailed were an en banc rehearing granted.
A.
Governing Labor and Arbitration Law
Because the issues in Deflategate involve rights under the NFL’s
and NFLPA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) governs.159 Judicial review of an arbitration award under LMRA § 301 is “very limited.”160 A court is precluded “from resolving merits of parties’ labor
disputes on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”161 The construction of the
CBA and determination of any facts at issue, “however good, bad,
or ugly,” are for the arbitrator—and only the arbitrator—to decide.162
Rather than interpreting the CBA or assessing the facts, the purpose of judicial review of labor disputes is instead to determine if
the arbitrator was “even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority.”163 So long as the
arbitrator’s decision draws “its essence from the [CBA]” and is not
merely the arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice,” then the
decision must be confirmed.164
Although an arbitral decision must be drawn from the CBA, the
arbitrator is also bound by what is referred to as the “common law
of the shop”: “The labor arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to
the express provisions of the [CBA], as the industrial common
law—the practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a part of
the [CBA] although not expressed in it.”165 It is accepted that the
common law of the shop of professional football requires that players be provided “advance notice of prohibited conduct and potential

159
29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012); see Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001).
160
Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509.
161
Id. at 511.
162
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013).
163
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
164
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
165
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581–82 (1960).
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discipline.”166 As stated by former neutral NFL arbitrators, “adequate notice is the fundamental concept in discipline cases,”167 and
disciplinary programs “require[] that individuals subject to that program understand, with reasonable certainty, what results will occur
if they breach established rules.”168
While judicial review of an arbitration award is limited, so is the
deference afforded to it.169 The Federal Arbitration Act provides that
a court may vacate an arbitration award “where the arbitrators . . .
refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,”170 or “where there was evident partiality.”171
B.
Article 46’s Provisions
Article 46, Section 1(a) of the CBA states that the Commissioner
may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”172 Article 46, Section 2(a) states that “the Commissioner may
serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”173 Article 46, Section 2(b) states that “[t]he
NFLPA and NFL have the right to attend all hearings provided for
in this Article and to present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to the hearing.”174 Article 46, Section 2(f)(ii) states
that “[i]n appeals under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely on no later than
three (3) calendar days prior to the hearing.”175
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NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 32 (1987).
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C.
The Standard NFL Player Contract
In the Standard NFL Player Contract, which can be found in Appendix A of the CBA,176 players are provided notice of the following:
Player recognizes the detriment to the League and
professional football that would result from impairment of public confidence in the honest and orderly
conduct of NFL games or the integrity and good
character of NFL players. Player therefore acknowledges his awareness that if he . . . is guilty of any . . .
form of conduct reasonably judged by the League
Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or
professional football, the Commissioner will have
the right, but only after giving Player the opportunity
for a hearing at which he may be represented by
counsel of his choice, to fine Player in a reasonable
amount; to suspend Player for a period certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this contract.177
D.
Notice
Similar to the three judicial opinions discussed above,178 the below analysis related to notice will be structured as follows: (1)
whether Brady had notice he could be suspended, rather than fined;
(2) whether Brady had notice he could be suspended for four games
under a comparison between deflating footballs and steroid use; (3)
whether Brady was on notice he could be punished for the specific
type of conduct he engaged in; and (4) whether Brady was on notice
he could be disciplined for providing inducements and rewards.
1.
SUSPENSION OR FINE
Both Brady and Judge Berman argued that the only notice provided to Brady was that he could be fined under the Player Policies
in the amount of $5,512 “for player equipment violations designed

176
177
178

See generally id. app. at 256–64.
Id. app. at 261–62.
See supra Parts II and III.
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to gain a competitive advantage.”179 But this argument fails for the
reasons presented by Judge Parker, among others.
Judge Parker noted that the 2014 Schedule of Fines (incorporated into the Player Policies) provides that “other forms of discipline, including higher fines and suspension may also be imposed,
based on the circumstances of the particular violation.”180 Thus,
even if it were true that Goodell based Brady’s discipline on the
Player Policies and the 2014 Schedule of Fines, Judge Parker was
correct in finding that Goodell arguably construed the terms above,
as a suspension is permissible under the 2014 Schedule of Fines.
Thus, Brady was on notice that his actions could result in suspension.181
However, that method of reasoning is unnecessary. Pursuant to
Article 46 of the CBA, Goodell is granted the authority to suspend
any player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”182 Further, pursuant
to the Standard NFL Player Contract, which Brady signed, the Commissioner is permitted to suspend a player if the Commissioner “reasonably judge[s]” that the player’s conduct was “detrimental to the
League or professional football.”183 Because Brady signed the
Standard NFL Player Contract, he was provided with notice of the
language within it. In other words, here, Brady was provided with
clear notice of the possibility of being suspended for conduct detrimental to the League when he signed his NFL Player Contract.
2.
ANALOGIZING DEFLATING FOOTBALLS TO STEROID USE
Judge Berman found that Brady had no notice that his suspension would be based on a comparison between deflating footballs
and steroid use.184 Judge Berman reasoned that “as a matter of law,
[the NFL’s Steroid Policy cannot] serve as adequate notice of discipline to Brady,”185 and, as a result, “Goodell may be said to have
179
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‘dispensed his own brand of industrial justice.’”186 In contrast, Judge
Parker found that “[w]hile [Brady] may have been entitled to notice
of his range of punishment, it does not follow that he was entitled to
advance notice of the analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive
in selecting a punishment within that range.”187 While both arguments have merit, based on controlling principles of arbitration and
labor law, Judge Parker’s position prevails.
Article 46, which grants Goodell the authority to discipline play188
ers and provides the procedural details for disciplinary proceedings,189 provides in relevant part that “[a]s soon as practicable following the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer will render
a written decision which will constitute full, final and complete disposition of the dispute and will be binding upon the player(s),
Club(s) and the parties to this Agreement with respect to that dispute.”190 Nothing in the CBA, and more specifically, nothing in Article 46 or the Standard NFL Player Contract that Brady signed,
mandates that Goodell explain his reasoning, or provide any analogy
used, in determining the discipline imposed.191 Although comparing
deflating footballs to using steroids may be a stretch of an analogy,
Goodell arguably construed the CBA provision above.
Dissenting Chief Judge Katzmann’s position was that the more
appropriate comparison would have been between deflating footballs and using stickum, given that use of stickum and deflation of
footballs both “involve attempts at improving one’s grip and evading the referees’ enforcement of the rules.”192 However, courts are
precluded “from resolving merits of parties’ labor disputes on basis
of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision”193—and this is precisely what Judge Katzmann
was attempting to do. In other words, Judge Katzmann argued
Goodell’s analogy to steroid use was erroneous, and instead,
Goodell should have compared deflating footballs to using stickum.
186
Id. at 466 (quoting 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527
(2d Cir. 2005)).
187
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 540 (2d Cir. 2016).
188
See NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204–05.
189
See id. at 205.
190
Id.
191
See generally id.
192
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 552 (Katzman, J., dissenting).
193
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001).
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But, as the above principle mandates, Judge Katzmann is forbidden
from resolving this dispute on his own factual determination, regardless of how erroneous he believed Goodell’s analogy was.
Further, as Judge Parker stated, “[i]f deference means anything,
it means that the arbitrator is entitled to generous latitude in phrasing
his conclusions.”194 The larger issue under analysis was whether
Goodell “arguably constru[ed]”195 the authority granted to him under Article 46 of the CBA. Given that Article 46 does not require
Goodell to explain the reasoning used to determine the award,
Goodell was free to suspend Brady for four games, whether based
on an analogy to steroid use, stickum, gambling, or otherwise, so
long as Brady was on notice that he could be punished for his conduct. Thus, Goodell arguably construed the CBA, even though the
analogy he applied may have been irrational.
3.
PUNISHMENT FOR SPECIFIC CONDUCT
Judge Berman stated that “[n]o NFL policy or precedent provided notice that a player could be subject to discipline for general
awareness of another person’s alleged misconduct.”196 Further,
Judge Berman echoed Brady’s contention that “no player suspension in NFL history has been sustained for an alleged failure to cooperate with—or even allegedly obstructing—an NFL investigation.”197 In other words, because no NFL player had ever been disciplined for being generally aware of others’ misconduct, and/or
failing to cooperate with an investigation, Judge Berman found that
Goodell violated the common law of the shop, and thus dispensed
his own brand of industrial justice.198 Judge Parker, on the other
hand, found that Brady was not suspended solely for being generally
aware of others’ misconduct, or solely for non-cooperation with the
Wells investigation, but rather, for being generally aware of others’
misconduct and for non-cooperation.199

194

NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 540.
See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 30
(1987).
196
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
197
Id. at 465.
198
See id. at 466.
199
See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 541 (emphasis added).
195
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While Judge Parker was correct that Goodell disciplined Brady
for both of these findings together, rather than separately, it is also
true that there is no NFL precedent providing notice to players that
they can be disciplined for general awareness of others’ misconduct,
non-cooperation with an investigation, or both the former and the
latter. The counterview is that there is, in fact, NFL precedent that
provides notice to players that they can be disciplined for the (very
broadly defined) conduct detrimental standard found in Article 46
and/or the Standard NFL Player Contract.200
These conflicting views on disciplinary precedent beg the question: under the counterview above––that is, that there is precedent
that players have been disciplined for “conduct detrimental”––how
broadly is this conduct detrimental standard to be defined? Could
Goodell suspend a player for four games for partying the night before a big game, arguing that it qualifies as conduct detrimental to
the public confidence in the game of professional football? The answer to such a question is likely a resounding yes, yet critics and
fans may argue that such discipline seems too strict.201 Further, following Judge Berman’s position detailed above, it could be argued
that there is a lack of notice to the player that his conduct could fall
under the all-encompassing conduct detrimental standard, which, as
can be seen, may be applied so broadly as to inculpate any player
for previously undisciplined actions.
This analysis is based on two conflicting views of a complicated
legal standard: the law of the shop and its definition and application.
On the one hand, Judge Parker argues broadly that disciplining a
player for engaging in conduct detrimental does not violate the law
of the shop because players have been disciplined under this authority in the past. On the other hand, Judge Berman argues that punishing a player for engaging in conduct detrimental violates the law of
the shop if the specific conduct for which the player is being disciplined (e.g., deflating footballs) has never been the subject of discipline. Applying controlling arbitration principles, it logically follows that Goodell arguably construed the CBA, and thus complied
with the law of the shop, in that a player, like Brady, is provided

200
201

See NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204–05.
This question is discussed at length infra in Part V.
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notice of possible suspension under the conduct detrimental standard in Article 46 and/or the Standard NFL Player Contract. But, at
the same time, such a broad standard creates a slippery slope for
members of a union, or for those subject to a CBA, whereby the
disciplinarian, like Goodell, can justify his or her discipline simply
by reliance on an undefined standard, like conduct detrimental,
which provides limited precedent to players for specific conduct
they can and cannot engage in.
While both Judge Berman’s and Judge Parker’s views hold
merit, the issue of the undefined and arbitrary conduct detrimental
standard seems difficult to resolve. Although Brady conceded that
his conduct did, in fact, qualify as conduct detrimental, and confined
his arguments to specific notice and procedural issues (essentially
rendering this question discussed above untouched and without
analysis), Judge Berman and the Second Circuit could have, and
possibly should have, addressed the fairness of the conduct detrimental standard sua sponte, notwithstanding the fact that such a
standard was collectively bargained. As it currently stands, the
meaning of “conduct detrimental” is essentially left open to (only
Roger Goodell’s) interpretation––this uncertainty warranted en
banc review.
4.

DISCIPLINE FOR PROVIDING INDUCEMENTS AND REWARDS
Dissenting Chief Judge Katzmann found that Brady was not on
notice that he could be disciplined for providing “inducements and
rewards in support of the scheme.”202 Further, Judge Katzmann
stated that the Wells Report did not amount to a preponderance of
the evidence203 that Brady’s gifts were “intended as rewards or advance payment for deflating footballs in violation of [NFL]
rules.”204
202
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 550 (2d Cir. 2016) (Katzman, J.,
dissenting).
203
See 1 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Policy on Integrity of the Game & Enforcement of Competitive Rules, in ADMINISTRATIVE/BUSINESS OPERATIONS –
LEAGUE RULES & POLICIES, https://www.espn.com/pdf/2015/0902/espn_otl_
nflintegritypolicy.pdf C7, C8 (providing that the “standard of proof required to
find that a violation of the competitive rules has occurred shall be a Preponderance
of the Evidence. . . . It means that, as a whole, the fact sought to be proved is more
probable than not.”).
204
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 550 (Katzman, J., dissenting).
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In response, Judge Parker stated that the Wells Report made
clear that its conclusion was “significantly influenced by the substantial number of communications and events consistent with its
findings, including that McNally . . . received valuable items autographed by Tom Brady.”205 Further, Judge Parker explained that it
was noted in the Wells Report that “Brady [was] a constant reference point in the discussions between McNally and Jastremski
about . . . items to be received by McNally.”206 Judge Parker thereby
found that Brady was provided notice that these gifts were at issue
once the Wells Report was published.207
The issue restated is whether Brady was on notice that his relationship and communications with McNally and Jastremski would
be at issue in the arbitration, even though the Wells Report never
conclusively found that the three participated in a quid pro quo for
deflating footballs. The Wells Report only stated that Brady’s relationship and communications with Jastremski and McNally “significantly influenced” the conclusions.208 Judge Parker holds to the belief that knowledge of this significant influence was enough to put
Brady on notice that his relationship and communications with Jastremski and McNally would be at issue.209 Yet, Judge Katzmann
would require a finding consistent with the requisite standard of
proof that Brady “more probabl[y] than not” participated in a quid
pro quo with Jastremski and McNally for their efforts in deflating
footballs.210
In an attempt to determine which view prevails, an analogy—for
lack of a less ironic method of reasoning211—may offer insight. If
the law of the shop provides that a player is on notice that his conduct may lead to discipline because he was aware that there had
been discipline for similar conduct in the past,212 then it similarly

205

Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
Id.
207
See id.
208
WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 13.
209
See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 542.
210
See id. at 550 (Katzman, J., dissenting).
211
See supra Section IV.D.2. (addressing Commissioner Goodell’s analogy
between steroid use and deflating footballs).
212
See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 541 (Judge Parker offering his view
and applying of the law of the shop).
206
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follows that a player is on notice that a factor may influence the arbitrator’s decision because he was aware that it was an influential
factor in the past. In other words, because Brady was aware of the
“significant influence” that his relationship and communications
with Jastremski and McNally played in the Wells Report conclusion,213 he was therefore on notice that his relationship and communications with Jastremski and McNally could play a role in
Goodell’s final decision.
E.
Examining Jeff Pash
Goodell denied Brady’s motion to compel NFL Executive Vice
President Jeff Pash’s testimony at the arbitration hearing on the
grounds that Pash did not “play a substantive role in the investigation,” and that the Wells Report was “prepared entirely by the Paul
Weiss investigative team.”214 Given Mr. Wells’ testimony at the arbitration that Pash assisted in the editing process of the Wells Report,215 Judge Berman concluded that Pash’s testimony was, in fact,
necessary because Pash would have had “valuable insight into the
course and outcome of the investigation and into the drafting and
content of the Wells Report,” and could testify as to whether the
investigation was independent.216 In other words, Judge Berman argued that “Pash was in the best position to testify about the NFL’s
degree of involvement in, and potential shaping of, a heralded ‘independent’ [i]nvestigation.”217
Judge Parker took the position that Pash’s testimony about the
independence of the investigation and subsequent Wells Report
would have been separate from the main issue, which was whether
Brady had engaged in conduct detrimental to the NFL.218 Judge Parker found that “[t]he CBA does not require an independent investigation, and nothing would have prohibited [Goodell] from using an

213

WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 13.
Article 46 Appeal of Tom Brady, Decision on Hearing Witnesses and Discovery at SPA63, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/nfl_brief_
deflategate.pdf [hereinafter Decision on Hearing Witnesses].
215
See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
216
See id. at 471–72.
217
Id. at 472.
218
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 546 (2d Cir. 2016).
214
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in-house team to conduct the investigation.”219 Judge Parker also
added that Goodell “made clear that the independence of the Wells
Report” was immaterial to the discipline.220
Judge Parker’s position prevails under controlling arbitration
principles and CBA provisions. The Federal Arbitration Act requires that when “arbitrators [are] guilty of . . . refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,” then vacatur may
be necessary.221 In addition, vacatur is warranted only when fundamental fairness is violated.222 Generally, arbitrators “are endowed
with ‘discretion to admit or reject evidence and determine what materials may be cumulative or irrelevant.’”223
Article 46, Section 2(b) provides that “[t]he NFLPA and NFL
have the right to attend all hearings provided for in this Article and
to present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to the
hearing.”224 Article 46, Section 2(f)(ii) provides that “[i]n appeals
under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies of any exhibits
upon which they intend to rely no later than three (3) calendar days
prior to the hearing.”225
The text of Article 46 is straightforward—the CBA does not require that all evidence must be admitted; the CBA simply requires
that the relevant admitted evidence be exchanged no later than three
days before the hearing.226 Applied to the arbitration, Goodell’s
judgment that Pash did not play a substantive role in the investigation is in accordance with these CBA provisions. Goodell was
within his authorized discretion as arbitrator “to admit or reject evidence and determine what materials may be cumulative or irrelevant”227 when he decided that Pash’s testimony about the independence of the investigation (which Judge Parker accurately painted as
outside the main issue) was unnecessary. Although Judge Berman
and Brady may have believed that denying Pash’s testimony was
219

Id.
Id.
221
9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) (2012).
222
See 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2) (2012).
223
Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 283(GBD), 2013 WL
789642, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013).
224
NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 205.
225
Id.
226
Id. (emphasis added).
227
Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 2013 WL 789642, at *8.
220
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generally unfair, the CBA, which was negotiated and collectively
bargained, did not require Goodell to compel Pash’s testimony, so
long as Goodell believed––as he did––such testimony was not material or pertinent to the controversy. For these reasons, Judge Parker’s argument prevails on this issue.
F.
The Wells Report Investigative Notes
Goodell denied Brady’s motion requesting access to the Wells
Report investigative notes, claiming they “played no role in the disciplinary decisions; the Wells Report was the basis for those decisions.”228 Judge Berman, focusing on Paul, Weiss’s role as both
NFL investigators and NFL counsel, stated that “this change in roles
may have afforded Goodell (and Pash) greater access to valuable
impressions, insights, and other investigation information which
was not available to Brady.”229 Judge Parker found that Goodell reasonably interpreted the CBA to not require such expansive discovery.230 Judge Parker also noted that Goodell “did not review any of
Paul, Weiss’ internal interview notes or any other documents generated by Paul, Weiss other than the final report.”231
Goodell was within his authorized discretion as arbitrator to “admit or reject evidence” that he may consider irrelevant to the issue
presented.232 Article 46 of the CBA provides in relevant part that
“[i]n appeals under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies
of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely.”233 It should be noted
that Judge Berman stated that the change in roles of the Paul, Weiss
team “may have” afforded Goodell and Pash more access to these
investigative notes, and that Brady was restricted from materials that
“may have” led to his suspension.234 But “may have” does not
equate to “which they intend to rely,” which would trigger an exchange of exhibits. With these considerations in mind, Goodell con-

228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Decision on Hearing Witnesses, supra note 214, at SPA65.
NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 547 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 546–47.
Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 2013 WL 789642, at *8.
NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 205 (emphasis added).
See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 472–73.
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strued Article 46 to mean that Brady’s possession of the Wells Report investigative notes was unnecessary because Paul, Weiss—acting as counsel to the NFL—did not intend to rely on them.
Further, the issue presented in the arbitration hearing was
whether Goodell’s initial discipline was justified. Goodell emphasized the fact that he never considered the investigative notes when
determining whether, and for how long, he would discipline
Brady—rather, he stated that he focused solely on the Wells Report.
Although Judge Berman expressed concern with the seemingly conflicting roles played by Paul, Weiss (i.e., both as investigator for and
counsel to the NFL), nothing in the CBA mandates that the investigation be conducted by an independent team, or a team independent
to those representing an adverse party. Judge Parker correctly concluded that Goodell was, at the very least, arguably construing the
CBA, and thus, did not violate the necessity of fundamental fairness.
Though the CBA does not forbid an investigative party subsequently acting as counsel, the apparent conflict raises questions. The
CBA offers no means for someone like Brady who is attempting to
gain access to evidence that only the disciplinarian had access to.
Should Brady have trusted that Goodell was honest in his assertion
that the discipline was based solely on the Wells Report? Imagine if
the roles were reversed, and Brady had hired Paul, Weiss to represent him during the arbitration. It is “more probable than not” that
Goodell would feel discomfort knowing that Brady hired the team
who conducted the investigation to represent him. There is an element of unfairness in this dynamic, though not necessarily under
controlling legal principles.
G.
Brady’s Request for En Banc Review
Based on the above discussion, there is a colorable argument that
the Second Circuit should have granted en banc review. Brady and
Judge Berman focused primarily on issues related to notice, fairness,
and the law of the shop,235 while Judge Parker focused primarily on
whether Goodell acted within his broad authority as arbitrator and
under the CBA.236 While it is argued above that the majority of

235
236

See generally id.
See generally NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Judge Parker’s arguments would have prevailed should en banc review have been granted, it is unclear whether Brady was on notice
that his specific conduct could have led to a four-game suspension.237 Further, none of the three writing judges discussed the
vagueness and arbitrary application of the CBA’s conduct detrimental standard found in Article 46 and the Standard NFL Player
Contract.
H.
Commentary to the Second Circuit’s Majority Opinion
Former Solicitor General, Ted Olson, who joined Brady’s legal
team just prior to Brady’s request for en banc review, emphasized
the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision, writing that this matter
“raises significant labor law issues that could have far-reaching consequences for all employees subject to [CBAs].”238 Olson pointed
out that the legal issues in “the [Second Circuit’s] opinion are of
great importance not only to NFL players, but to all unionized employees.”239
Olson is correct—all unionized employees and employees subject to CBAs could be affected by the Second Circuit’s holding. In
fact, the following outlined scenario provides an example of how
broadly and unfairly the Second Circuit’s holding could be applied:
(1) an employee can be investigated by his or her boss for engaging
in conduct never before disciplined; (2) the employee can be disciplined by that boss, despite this type of conduct never being the subject of discipline before; (3) given no previous similar discipline, the
boss can assign whatever discipline he or she wishes; (4) the severity
of discipline can be based on a ludicrous comparison to an irrelevant
disciplinary policy; (5) the employee’s appeal will be heard by none
other than the same boss who initially disciplined the employee; (6)
the boss can make a final decision confirming the initial discipline
based on new facts revealed only at the appeal; (7) the employee can
elect to appeal to a federal district court, but face the burden of the
237

See supra Section IV.D.3.
Michael Hurley, Hurley: How Tom Brady Can Appeal to Second Circuit
for Rehearing En Banc, CBS BOSTON (May 5, 2016, 1:14 PM), http://boston.
cbslocal.com/2016/05/05/tom-brady-appeal-second-circuit-en-banc-rehearingen-banc/; see Theodore B. Olson: Biography, GIBSON DUNN, https://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyer/olson-theodore-b/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
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Hurley, supra note 238.
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extraordinary cost of litigation; and (8) the reviewing court(s) can
confirm the boss’ discipline and arbitration award, pointing to the
deference afforded to arbitration awards and to the CBA to which
the employee had no individual input.
Put another way: We were all in grade school once. Imagine
your teacher sends you to detention. Now, imagine that you have the
right to challenge that discipline. Unfortunately for you, your challenge must be made to that same teacher. Good luck.
V.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NFL COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY

Deflategate is just one of many similar scandals in which
Goodell’s broad authority was at issue or applied.240 But does the
NFL Commissioner have too much authority? This Part will offer
insight into the extent of the NFL Commissioner’s authority. Thereafter, this Part will offer points for consideration for the negotiations
and collective bargaining that will occur following the current
CBA’s expiration after the 2020–2021 NFL season.
A.
The Power of Article 46
Article 46, Section 1(a) of the CBA states that the Commissioner
may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”241 Article 46, Section 2(a) states that “the Commissioner may

240

The NFL has faced many scandals over the years. However, the scandals
most relevant and similar to Deflategate are the Ray Rice, Adrian Peterson, and
Ezekiel Elliott scandals. For more information on the Ray Rice scandal, see Don
Van Natta Jr. & Kevin Van Valkenburg, Rice Case: Purposeful Misdirection by
Team, Scant Investigation by NFL, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.espn.com/
espn/otl/story/_/id/11551518/how-ray-rice-scandal-unfolded-baltimore-ravensroger-goodell-nfl. For more information on the Adrian Peterson scandal, see Michael McCann, Roger Goodell’s Power to Discipline Stronger than Ever After
Win v. Adrian Peterson, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2016/08/04/adrian-peterson-appeals-court-suspensionroger-goodell-wins. For more information on the Ezekiel Elliott scandal, see
Jeanna Thomas, The Ezekiel Elliott Suspension Explained in a 2-Minute Read,
SBNATION, https://www.sbnation.com/2017/11/19/16666714/ezekiel-elliott-nflsuspension-cowboys-ex (last updated Dec. 24, 2017, 4:37 PM).
241
NFL CBA supra note 172, at 204.
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serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”242
Pursuant to the Standard NFL Player Contract, which can be
found in Appendix A of the CBA,243 the Commissioner holds the
following authority:
Player therefore acknowledges his awareness that if
he . . . is guilty of any . . . form of conduct reasonably
judged by the League Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football, the
Commissioner will have the right . . . to fine Player
in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a period certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this
contract.244
These provisions prompt questions and concerns. First, under
Article 46, Section 1(a), how broadly is “conduct detrimental” to be
stretched? Looking to Deflategate, it was stretched almost to the
point of snapping––the insignificant finding that Brady was “at least
generally aware” of others’ misconduct constituted (notably, for the
first time in NFL history) sufficient detrimental conduct worthy of
a four-game suspension. But under what analytical test is such detrimental conduct to be judged? Is it fair that only one person––the
Commissioner––determines the ultimate discipline? Is conduct detrimental as a disciplinary standard inherently fair because a deferential court suggests it is,245 or because other major league sports
organizations have similar standards and provisions in their respective collective bargaining agreements?246 As mentioned above, un-
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Id. at 205.
See id. app. at 256–64.
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Id. app. at 261–62 (emphasis added).
245
See generally NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
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See generally MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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fortunately, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit in Deflategate discussed these concerns about the conduct detrimental
standard.247
Second, and most troubling, is the inconsistent and unreasonably
broad authority that is granted to the NFL Commissioner in the
Standard NFL Player Contract. According to its text, if the Commissioner were to “reasonably judge[]” that a player has engaged in
conduct detrimental to the NFL, then the Commissioner has the contractual right to suspend the player indefinitely or terminate his contract.248 It is important to note the differences between the language
in Article 46, Section 1(a), and the language in the Standard NFL
Player Contract. In the former, the Commissioner is permitted to
discipline a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or
public confidence in, the game of professional football.”249 Whereas
in the latter, the Commissioner is permitted to discipline a player
(e.g., he can terminate his contract, which is not permitted in Article
46, Section 1(a)) for conduct that he or she reasonably judges to be
detrimental to the League.250 In the former, “reasonably judges,”
which is a low threshold and an entirely discretionary standard, is
absent. In the latter, “to the League” is much broader, allowing for
more flexibility in application when compared to the former’s “to
the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football.” These differences beg the question: what conduct could
be reasonably judged as detrimental to the NFL? Could Roger
Goodell terminate the contract of a player invoking his First Amendment right?
Throughout the 2016–2017 NFL season, former San Francisco
49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick knelt during the national anthem in protest against police brutality of minorities.251 Many fellow
(2012),
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_
CBA.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA].
247
See infra Parts II & III.
248
See NFL CBA, supra note 172, app. at 261–62.
249
Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
250
See id. app. at 261–62.
251
See Steve Wyche, Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During National
Anthem, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000
691077/article/colin-kaepernick-explains-protest-of-national-anthem (last updated Aug. 28, 2016, 4:33 PM). In an interview with NFL Media Reporter Steve
Wyche, Kaepernick stated, “I’m not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for
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NFL players followed Kaepernick and began kneeling in protest, as
well.252 In his usual controversial fashion, on September 22, 2017,
during a rally for Alabama Senate Republican candidate Luther
Strange, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump stated the following in response to the NFL player protests:
Wouldn’t you love to see one of these NFL owners,
when somebody disrespects our flag, to say “Get that
son of a b[****] off the field right now. Out! He’s
fired. He’s fired!” . . . [Y]ou know what’s hurting the
game . . . ? When people like yourselves turn on television and you see those people taking the knee
when they’re playing our great national anthem. The
only thing you could do better is if you see it, even if
it’s one player, leave the stadium. I guarantee things
will stop.253
Two days later, on September 24, 2017, in a display of solidarity
following Trump’s controversial comments, dozens of NFL players,
along with some team owners, knelt in protest.254 Several players
who did not kneel, instead stood and locked arms with teammates in
solidarity.255 And, every player from the Seattle Seahawks and Tennessee Titans remained in their locker rooms during the national anthem.256
a country that oppresses black people and people of color . . . There are bodies in
the street and people getting paid leave and getting away with murder.” Id.
252
For a list of NFL players who have knelt in solidarity with Colin Kaepernick, see Arian Foster, Marcus Peters Among NFL Players Protesting During
National Anthem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.si.com/
nfl/2016/09/11/national-anthem-protest-kneel-sit-players-list.
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Sophie Tatum, Trump: NFL Owners Should Fire Players Who Protest the
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Bryan Armen Graham, Donald Trump Blasts NFL Anthem Protestors: ‘Get that
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Are President Trump’s comments without merit? Could a player
actually be fired for kneeling in protest? Pursuant to the language of
the Standard NFL Player Contract discussed above, it is reasonable
to conclude that the Commissioner would indeed be permitted to
terminate the contract of any player kneeling in protest, so long as
the Commissioner could “reasonably judge[ ]” that such protest is
detrimental to the NFL.257 But what conduct could be detrimental?
The NFL is a business dependent upon public image. Thus, any conduct that could compromise the NFL’s public image could be reasonably judged as detrimental to the NFL. Recent television ratings
reports show that NFL ratings are in decline, in part due to these
player protests.258 Even more, in response to the player protests,
many fans have boycotted the NFL––either because they are offended by the protests,259 or because they dislike that Kaepernick

257

See NFL CBA, supra note 172, app. at 261–62. It is important to note that
President Trump’s comments were in the context of NFL team owners––not the
NFL Commissioner––firing protesting players. This distinction is rather important, given the different authority that team owners and the Commissioner possess under the CBA. See generally id. This Note is focused solely on the Commissioner’s authority. However, for an in-depth discussion on the legality of an
NFL team owner firing a protesting player, see Michael McCann, Can an NFL
Owner Legally ‘Fire’ a Player for Protesting?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 23,
2017),
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has been “blackballed” by the NFL.260 Notably, on October 8, 2017,
during a game between the Indianapolis Colts and the San Francisco
49ers, Vice President Mike Pence controversially left the game in
response to a number of players kneeling during the national anthem.261
In other words, President Trump’s statements, Vice President
Pence’s reactionary protest, boycotts, and declining television ratings would not have occurred but for the players kneeling in protest
during the national anthem. And, the player protests, no matter how
constitutional, peaceful, and well-intentioned as they may be, could
be reasonably judged as detrimental to the NFL, giving the Commissioner grounds for terminating their contracts pursuant to the
Standard NFL Player Contract. But, although permissible, would
such a termination be right? Should Goodell be given such broad
disciplinary authority?
B.
Looking to the 2021 CBA
As highlighted above, the NFL Commissioner’s authority is far
too broad in three ways. First, the Commissioner is permitted to discipline a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football,” which is an undefined and arbitrary standard, subject only to the Commissioner’s interpretation.262 Second, the Commissioner is permitted to elect him
260
Kevin B. Blackistone, The NFL Has Effectively Blackballed Colin Kaepernick, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/the-nfl-has-effectively-blackballed-colin-kaepernick/2017/03/23/d0b754d
6-0fd1-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html?utm_term=.bd5048f197aa; Scott
Gleeson, Steve Kerr: ‘No-brainer’ that Colin Kaepernick is Being ‘blackballed’
in NFL, USA TODAY: SPORTS (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/warriors/2017/10/31/steve-kerr-colin-kaepernickwhite-house-nfl-nba/816441001/. In response to being blackballed by the NFL,
Colin Kaepernick has filed a grievance against the NFL for collusion. For more
information and an in-depth analysis on Kaepernick’s grievance against the NFL,
see Michael McCann, Kaepernick Collusion Case: What Does It Mean that Jones,
Kraft, Other Owners Will Be Deposed?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 3, 2017),
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261
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or herself as the arbitrator in any challenge of an initial discipline.263
Third, the Commissioner is permitted to discipline any player for
conduct that the Commissioner reasonably judges as detrimental to
the NFL.264 There is no question that the NFLPA collectively bargained poorly with respect to Commissioner authority in the 2011
CBA.265 However, the current CBA expires following the 2020–
2021 NFL season,266 lending the NFLPA an opportunity to remedy
its prior efforts. And the NFLPA has already expressed its commitment to revise the structures and provisions present in the 2011
CBA.267
It is important to first note the relevant similarities and differences between the NFL’s CBA and the CBAs of Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Basketball Association
(“NBA”). The MLB CBA provides that the MLB Commissioner is
permitted to discipline players for conduct that questions “the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball.”268 Further, pursuant to Article XI(A)(1)(b) of the MLB CBA,
Commissioner disciplinary action can only be appealed directly to
the Commissioner.269 As for the NBA CBA, the NBA Commis-
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sioner may discipline players for conduct that questions “the integrity of, or the public confidence in, the game of basketball.”270 However, the NBA CBA differs from the NBA and NFL CBAs regarding
Commissioner authority with respect to who may act as the hearing
officer of an appeal:
If a player’s punishment for off-court conduct results
in a financial impact of $50,000 or less, Commissioner discipline is only reviewable by the Commissioner. If, however, punishment results in financial
impact of more than $50,000, a player may file a
grievance and have it heard by an impartial arbitrator.271
Therefore, the NFL, MLB, and NBA CBAs are all similar in terms
of Commissioner’s authority regarding player conduct and appeal
procedures, notwithstanding the NBA’s $50,000 threshold for impartial arbitrator or Commissioner review.
But are there more reasonable alternatives to these provisions?
With respect to disciplinary appeals, as governed by Article 46, Section 2(a) of the NFL CBA,272 attorney Adriano Pacifici recommended a reasonable alternative that may provide more fairness to
players.273 His recommendation was simple––the NFL should
“adopt a hybrid system of commissioner disciplinary review,” limiting the Commissioner’s authority solely to determining initial discipline.274 Under Mr. Pacifici’s hybrid system, rather than the Commissioner having the contractual discretion to elect him or herself as
the arbitrator for an appeal to his or her discipline, three neutral and
independent arbitrators would hear and decide all appeals.275 The
three arbitrators would be selected from a list of nine potential arbitrators from the American Arbitration Association, wherein the
270
NBA CBA, supra note 246, at 401, 404–05; accord CARFAGNA, supra note
268, at 8.
271
CARFAGNA, supra note 268, at 8; accord NBA CBA, supra note 246, at
404–05.
272
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273
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112–15 (2014).
274
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275
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NFLPA and the NFL would each “have the ability to eliminate three
potential arbitrators, leaving them with a three-person panel.”276 Mr.
Pacifici’s hybrid system is consistent with the current system mandated by the National Hockey League (“NHL”) CBA, which provides for impartial and independent arbitrators to review the NHL
Commissioner’s disciplinary decisions.277 Should the NFL commit
to such a hybrid system, the NBA and MLB may follow suit, thereby
providing for fairness to all major league sports players and, ideally,
consistency across professional sports.
As for Article 46, Section 1(a), which states that the Commissioner may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football,”278 a reasonable alternative may not be so obvious. After all,
each of the other three major sports leagues––the NBA, MLB, and
NHL––have similar provisions granting the Commissioner broad
authority to discipline conduct that undermines the integrity of or
public confidence in the respective sport and league. That being
said, the Commissioner authority found in the Standard NFL Player
Contract is too broad and needs revision––otherwise, as established
above, the Commissioner could discipline, and even terminate the
contract of, any player who engages in constitutionally-protected
behavior, such as kneeling in protest in accordance with the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
During the collective bargaining and negotiation stages for the
new CBA, the NFLPA should focus its efforts on revising Article
46, Section 2(a) to accord with Mr. Pacifici’s hybrid system, and
striking the provision in the Standard NFL Player Contract that
grants the Commissioner authority to discipline––and even fire––a
player for conduct reasonably judged by the Commissioner as detrimental to the NFL. Though, why would the NFL agree to any contractual revisions in this respect? What leverage does, or could, the
NFLPA have in bargaining for these contractual revisions?

276
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278
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First, as was recently argued by the former NFLPA President,
Domonique Foxworth, the NFLPA can decertify as a union and, instead, operate as a trade association.279 According to Foxworth,
“[t]he existence of unions allows leagues to operate under rules that
are in violation of federal antitrust law, which is why decertifying
has been the most impactful threat to leagues.”280 Under an association, the players
would be working under rules imposed by the
leagues, not agreed upon with the players––rules that
are clear violations of federal antitrust law: franchise
tag, salary caps and luxury tax, minimum salary limits . . . drafts and age restrictions, the NFL’s infamous
commissioner power in Article 46, etc. It would force
the [NFL] back into a world they fear, a world where
they have to follow the same laws as other businesses
or be exposed to the risk of treble damages.281
In other words, decertifying could grant the NFLPA leverage in advance of the upcoming collective bargaining.
But decertifying presents a host of legal and practical difficulties. Decertifying worked against the NFLPA during the 2011 NFL
CBA negotiations.282 The NFL called the NFLPA’s move to decertify a sham.283 And, in Brady v. Nat’l Football League, the Eighth
Circuit agreed, finding that the NFLPA had decertified when negotiations were at an impasse, and thus, the NFL was still entitled to
operate under already existing antitrust exemptions.284 According to
Foxworth, “decertifying now, well in advance of any negotiations,
is a more than sufficient ‘distance in time’ to avoid” an accusation

279
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from the NFL that decertifying is a sham to create leverage for CBA
negotiations.285
Decertifying could pay off dividends (assuming it is done genuinely and not as a sham). But given the obvious risks in such a
move,286 an alternative means to limiting the Commissioner’s authority is a renegotiation of total NFL revenue sharing. Under the
2011 CBA, the NFLPA is entitled to 47% of all revenue from 2011
through 2021.287 Should the scenario arise during upcoming negotiations, the NFL should agree to additional player protections incorporated into the CBA––including a limitation of Commissioner authority as outlined above––in exchange for the NFLPA’s reduced
share of NFL revenue from 47% to 46% from 2021 to 2031. Neither
the NFL nor the NFLPA have much to lose in such an agreement.
Looking to the NFL’s total revenue for 2016, which was roughly
$14 billion,288 the players’ 47% share under the 2011 CBA equated
to roughly $6.58 billion. However, should the players only take 46%
of the $14 billion revenue figure, the share equates to roughly $6.44
billion, which is still quite a lot of money. From the NFL’s perspective, using the $14 billion revenue figure as a baseline, an additional
annual 1% share of revenue from 2021 through 2031 would amount
to $1.4 billion. But even this $1.4 billion figure may be significantly
understated, given that Goodell has expressed that he wants total
NFL annual revenues to reach $25 billion by 2027.289 From the
NFLPA’s perspective, losing $140 million annually seems too
costly at first. But, as noted above, 46% of the 2016 NFL total revenue still equated to a substantial amount of money. And, again,
with each year that the NFL continues to see an increase in its total
revenue, the NFLPA’s financial losses will quickly be mitigated.
285

Foxworth, supra note 279.
For more information on further risks that come with decertifying, see id.
287
NFL Clubs Approve Comprehensive Agreement, NAT’L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE (July 21, 2011), https://nfllabor.wordpress.com/2011/07/21/nfl-clubsapprove-comprehensive-agreement/.
288
Daniel Kaplan, NFL Revenue Reaches $14B, Fueled by Media,
SPORTSBUSINESS J. (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/
Issues/2017/03/06/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NFL-revenue.aspx.
289
Mike Florio, Goodell Wants NFL to Be Earning $25 billion per Year by
2027, NBC SPORTS (April 5, 2010, 1:05 PM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2010/04/05/goodell-wants-nfl-to-be-earning-25-billion-per-yearby-2027/.
286

2018]

DEFLATEGATE PUMPED UP

877

Nonetheless, despite the obvious benefit to both parties––i.e., the
NFLPA contractually protects its players and the NFL makes more
money––the necessary question in determining whether such an
agreement could materialize is whether the NFL and NFLPA believe a difference in revenue sharing is worth the additional protections to the players.
Should decertifying and revising NFL revenue sharing prove to
be unsuccessful strategies, it is recommended here that the NFL, and
more specifically, Commissioner Goodell, should remain flexible
during collective bargaining in an attempt to repair the NFL’s public
image. It goes without saying that Roger Goodell (and thus, the
NFL), has a public perception problem—“[he] has a 28 percent job
approval rating, with 42 percent disapproving and 30 percent unsure. It’s even worse when respondents were asked if they have a
favorable or unfavorable opinion of [Goodell]—19 percent thumbsup, 40 percent thumbs-down, 40 percent not sure.”290 This level of
disapproval may be because of the way Goodell has been perceived
during and after his handling of NFL scandals, including the Bountygate,291 Ray Rice,292 Adrian Peterson,293 Deflategate, and Ezekiel
Elliott294 matters.
Fans love the NFL and buy its products because of their admiration for the players. But many players have grown to strongly dislike
Goodell and have expressed such sentiments publicly.295 Players’
distaste for Goodell could be imputed to fans—and if fans dislike
Goodell, then it naturally follows that the NFL’s abysmal approval
rating296 may be in part due to the conflict between the players and
Goodell.
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Examples of players’ disdain for Goodell are endless. In a 2010
interview with NFL Network, former Chicago Bears linebacker
Brian Urlacher stated the following about Goodell: “It’s a dictatorship. . . . If [Roger] Goodell wants to fine you he’s going to fine you,
that’s the way it goes and that’s just the way it is.”297 Former Pittsburgh Steelers linebacker James Harrison has said that he “hate[s]
[Goodell] and will never respect him.”298 Former Pittsburgh Steelers
free safety Ryan Clark, once an NFLPA representative and now an
ESPN NFL analyst,299 stated the following in an ESPN interview:
When you’ve been in those meetings and you’ve
been through labor negotiations, and you see how
Roger Goodell and the owners feel about the players,
the things that were said to the players during this
time, you develop a hate—you really do, . . . [a]nd
sometimes you can’t see through that hate. Sometimes it factors into all of your thoughts about the
NFL, about the owners, about Roger Goodell.300
Former New Orleans Saints linebacker Jonathan Vilma co-owns a
restaurant in Miami that has a picture of Goodell with the caption
“DO NOT SERVE THIS MAN.”301 In an interview with Sports Il-
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lustrated, New Orleans Saints quarterback Drew Bress said the following about Goodell and his Article 46 powers: “[H]e definitely
has too much power. . . . He is judge, jury and executioner when
it comes to all the discipline. I’m not going to trust any league-led
investigation, when it comes to anything.”302
Goodell’s conduct single-handedly affects the NFL’s success—
and thus far, his conduct, as the above demonstrates, seems more
detrimental than beneficial. If Goodell wants to repair the NFL’s
public image, he and the NFL Management Council should be open
to limiting the power he has as “judge, jury, and executioner.”303
CONCLUSION
Although the public’s interest in Deflategate was largely based
in its love of football, Deflategate was a scandal rooted in law. This
Note analyzed the district court and Second Circuit decisions in an
attempt to act as the tiebreaker between two federal judges (Judges
Berman and Katzmann) finding in favor of Brady and two federal
judges (Judges Parker and Chin) finding in favor of Roger Goodell
and the NFL.
But from Deflategate, and the other relevant NFL scandals, a
question must be raised: is the NFL Commissioner’s authority under
the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement too broad? The
NFLPA certainly, and rightfully, believes so, and is expected to
push for a revision to limit the Commissioner’s authority as the bargaining stage for the 2021 CBA approaches. This Note highlighted
the relevant provisions of the 2011 CBA that will likely be at issue
during future negotiations and collective bargaining. This Note also
recommended ways in which the NFLPA could create leverage in
advance of these negotiations, and explained how the public image
dilemma that the NFL and Roger Goodell face could and should influence their approach during negotiations.
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